Proposed amendment to legal presumption about the reliability of computers

Houses of Parliament, taken on 26 Nov 2024

I am grateful to the journalist Tom Webb, who specialises in data protection, for alerting me to an amendment to the Data (Use and Access) Bill, currently going through the House of Lords.

It concerns the legal presumption that “mechanical instruments” (which seems to be taken to include computer networks) are working properly if they look to the user like they’re working properly. This has come in for quite a kicking in recent years. I was first alerted to it in 2013 by the barrister Stephen Mason.

Mason has spent longer than a decade telling anyone who will listen it is a deeply flawed legal presumption. Here he sets out his reasoning. Mason has won some influential supporters along the way, including Lord (James) Arbuthnot who has also spent longer than a decade campaigning on behalf of Subpostmasters affected by the Post Office scandal.

Although the “mechanical instruments” presumption has never, to the best of my knowledge, been quoted in any civil or criminal proceedings involving a Subpostmaster, it has been said to effectively reverse the burden of proof on anyone who might be convicted using digital evidence.

The logic being if the courts are going to assume a computer was working fine at the time an offence allegedly occurred because it looked like it was working fine, it is then down to the defendant to prove that it was not working fine. This can be extremely difficult to do (per the Seema Misra/Lee Castleton cases).

This is the amendment proposed by Lord Arbuthnot and others. I am grateful to Tom for bringing it to my attention. It says:

After Clause 132, insert the following new Clause –

Reliability of computer-based evidence

(1) Electronic evidence produced by or derived from a computer, device or computer system (separately or together “system”) is admissible as evidence in any proceedings –

(a) where that electronic evidence and the reliability of the system that produced it or from which it is derived are not challenged;
(b) where the court is satisfied that the reliability of the system cannot reasonably be challenged;
(c) where the court is satisfied that the electronic evidence is derived from a reliable system.

James Arbuthnot

(2) Rules of Court must provide that electronic evidence sought to be relied upon by a party in any proceedings may be challenged by another party as to its admissibility.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), Rules of Court must provide for the circumstances in which the Court may be satisfied that the admissibility of electronic evidence cannot reasonably be challenged.

(4) When determining whether a system is reliable for the purposes of subsection (1)(c) the matters that may be taken into account include –

(a) any instructions or rules of the system that apply to its operation;
(b) any measures taken to secure the integrity of data held on the system;
(c) any measures taken to prevent unauthorised access to and use of the system;
(d) the security of the hardware and software used by the system;
(e) any measures taken to monitor and assess the reliability of the system by the system controller or operator including steps taken to fix errors or address unexpected outcomes including the regularity of and extent of any audit of the system by an independent body;
(f) any assessment of the reliability of the system made by a body with supervisory or regulatory functions;
(g) the provisions of any scheme or industry standard that apply in relation
to the system.

(5) For the purposes of this section –

computer” means any device capable of performing mathematical or logical instructions;
device” means any apparatus or tool operating alone or connected to other apparatus or tools, that processes information or data in electronic form;
electronic evidence” means evidence derived from data contained in or produced by any device the functioning of which depends on a software program or from data stored on a computer, device or computer system or communicated over a networked computer system.”

Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment overturns the current legal assumption that evidence from computers is always reliable which has contributed to miscarriages of justice including the Horizon Scandal. It enables courts to ask questions of those submitting computer evidence about its reliability.

To read the amendment within the list of Lords amendments to the Bill so far, click here and scroll down to page 45.


The journalism on this blog is crowdfunded. If you would like to join the “secret email” newsletter, please consider making a one-off donation. The money is used to keep the contents of this website free. You will receive occasional, irregular but informative email updates about the Post Office Horizon IT scandal.

Share This:

6 responses to “Proposed amendment to legal presumption about the reliability of computers”

  1. More and more, I’ve come to conclude that the combined incompetence/fraudulence (as appropriate) of POL and its contractors was only the second point of failure and that the primary failing was the way in which the courts handled the defective cases. It has been noted before that the reversal of the PACE 1984 requirements for computer-based evidence was enacted just as the Horizon system was being created, and with the PO side rooting for the change (the posts at davidallengreen.com linked by Hazel above are one example).

    Good practice in software development, sufficient to give confidence, or otherwise, in the resulting product, significantly pre-dates 1999, and would doubtless have been in the minds of those guiding the 1984 requirements. In fact, today’s software development (think: almost every website/mobile application that you use) may often be less capable of being relied on for data of evidential quality than that of the PACE s.69 era.

    The proposed amendment is obviously an improvement, but:
    * clause 1(b) is an obvious loop-hole that should be removed, unless the Rules under clause 3 would always allow challenge;
    * clause 4 is phrased as guidance that has no legislative force (but IANAL) and could be removed, or it should say “… the matters to be taken into account …”
    * no similar clause/Note is included to illustrate what could lead to clause 1(b) being satisfied.
    * should there not be a requirement for an independent assessment of any system whose correct operation is necessary for evidence being adduced, where (1) costs of assessment are to be paid by the party claiming correctness and (2) the claim of correctness is denied if inadequate evidence is made available to the assessor?

    Or why not just restore (ie repeal s.60 of the1999 YJCE Act and reinstate) PACE(1984) s.69, for which there is already 15 years of precedent?

  2. I assume the intended meaning of sub-clause (1) is as though the words “and not otherwise” were to appear at the end of the sub-clause – ie the effect of it is to limit rather than enlarge the class of admissible evidence.

    And what does sub-clause (2) mean – I mean, isn’t what it says always true whether such a provision appears in the legislation or not?

  3. I thought legislation like this should read either
    (a) … ;
    (b) … ; or
    (c)

    or

    (a) … ;
    (b) … ; and
    (c)

    If I’m wrong, which is the actual meaning of the proposed legislation?

  4. David Allen Green has also written cogently about this, and the difference it might have made to the initial legal outcomes for sub-postmasters if the presumption re computer reliability had been the other way during the years of prosecutions: https://davidallengreen.com/2023/09/computer-says-guilty-an-introduction-to-the-evidential-presumption-that-computers-are-operating-correctly/

  5. Initiatives to overhaul the legal presumption about the reliability of computers are essential and long overdue. After almost 50 years’ experience working in industry on large and complex system employing computers I am in no doubt that there will always be both residual bugs, errors, & defects as of their initial deployment, and latent defects which appear on a long-tail distribution. Latent defects often appear years later when the original system is flexed to meet new operational requirements or is updated to deal with obsolescence. This problem has be proactively managed through appropriate organisational governance, policies, process, training. Post Office Limited never did understand this, nor did the listen to advice.

  6. One omission is an onus to reveal what automated test cases have been used to determine system behaviour. This would give expert witnesses the information they need to at least understand what the manufacturer was basing claims on.

    I’d like to see a right to see test suites, transaction and observability logs. I might go as far as assuming the system did not work as described if these things were lacking.

    This has struck me the whole way through. A 1999 system predates modern development techniques, yet somehow, the supplier got away with merely claiming it was fine. These days, there should be evidence during development and operation that could back up such claims. Or not, in the case of Horizon – it is clear much of this simply was not done.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Archives

  • 2024
  • 2023
  • 2022
  • 2021


Subscribe For Latest Blog Updates

Tags

Alan Bates alice perkins Alwen Lyons Andrew Winn Andy Dunks Andy Parsons Bates v Post Office BBC Bonusgate CCRC Chris Aujard Clarke Advice False Accounts Fujitsu Gareth Jenkins Grabiner HCAB Horizon Inquiry Interim Report Janet Skinner Jarnail Singh Lee Castleton Lord Arbuthnot Mark Davies Neuberger Nicki Arch Nick Read Noel Thomas Outcasts Creative Paula Vennells Paul Marshall Post Office Rebecca Thomson Receipts and Payments mismatch bug Rob Wilson Rod Ismay Rodric Williams Second Sight Seema Misra ShEx Simon Clarke Susan Crichton Tracy Felstead UKGI

Categories